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INTRODUCTION
Let the hardship be strong enough, and equity will find a way, though
many a formula of inaction may seem to bar the path. 1

– Justice Cardozo
In the fall of 2012, foreclosure filings in the United States fell to a
five-year low as fewer homes seemed to be in the grasp of mortgage
lenders. 2 This was the second consecutive monthly drop in filings,
although there still remained a sharp deviation along state lines. 3 For
example, in Illinois, third quarter reporting in 2012 revealed that home
foreclosure activity rose thirty-one percent compared to the same period
in 2011.4 The same report found Illinois had 42,176 foreclosure filings
from July through September 2012. 5 This figure represents 1 in every

1. Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 888 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (citing
Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U.S. 260, 284 (1891)).
2. Marcy Gordon, U.S. Foreclosure Filings Hit 5-Year Low in September, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 11, 2012, 12:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/foreclosure-filings2012_n_1956651.html.
3. Id.
4. Illinois Q3 foreclosures Up 31 percent over 2011, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Oct. 11,
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-10-11/illinois-q3-foreclosures-up-31-percent-over2011.
5. Marcy Gordon, U.S. Foreclosure Filings Fall, but Up 31 Percent in Illinois, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Oct. 11, 2012, at 1.
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126 housing units, the fourth highest rate in the country. 6 A closer
analysis of the number of foreclosures in Illinois reveals that in 2012,
foreclosures steadily rose throughout the six counties of Cook, Will,
Kane, Lake, McHenry, and DuPage. 7 The total number of home
foreclosures in January for the counties combined was 5138; 8 in
February, the total number jumped to 6168; 9 and in March, the number
of foreclosures increased to 6442. 10 Overall, there was approximately a
twenty-five percent increase from January to March of 2012. Over the
last three years, the number of foreclosures in Cook County alone was
higher than the other five northern Illinois counties combined. 11
Despite efforts to modify and renegotiate loans, the number of
residential foreclosures continues to rise, wreaking havoc across all
social and economic lines. As Sarah Raskin of the Federal Reserve
notes, “The wave of foreclosures is one of the factors hindering a rapid
recovery in the economy. Traditionally, the housing sector . . . has
played an important role in propelling economic recoveries.”12
Arguably, if there is a resolution to the foreclosure crisis, a recovery of
the national economy should soon follow. The real estate market and
the national economy are, without a doubt, closely intertwined.13
Chairman Ben Bernanke of the Federal Reserve stated, “Declining
house prices, delinquencies and foreclosures, and strains in mortgage
markets are now symptoms as well as causes of our general financial
and economic difficulties.” 14 Thus, there is a strong correlation
between losing one’s job and losing one’s home—without steady work,
borrowers are left scrambling to make their mortgage payments. 15 As a
6. Id.
7. Chicagoland Foreclosure Activity Soars in the 1st Quarter of 2012, ILL. FORECLOSURE
LISTING SERV. (May 7, 2012), http://ilfls.com/news/chicagoland-foreclosure-activity-soars-inthe-1st-quarter-of-2012. html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Sarah Bloom Raskin, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the
Association of American Law Schools’ Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C.: Creating and
Implementing an Enforcement Response to the Foreclosure Crisis 3 (Jan. 7, 2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/raskin20120107a.htm.
13. ZURICH, LINGERING EFFECTS OF THE RECESSION ON THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
MARKET 2 (2011), available at http://www.zurichna.com/internet/zna/sitecollectiondocuments/
en/knowledge%20center/whitepapers/real%20estate/effects-of-recession-on-cre-market.pdf.
14. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the
Federal Reserve System Conference on Housing & Mortgage Markets, Washington, D.C.:
Housing, Mortgage Markets, and Foreclosures 1 (Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081204a.htm.
15. Andrew Martin, For the Jobless, Little U.S. Help on Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
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result, a significant portion of our communities’ workforce, tax-base,
homeowners, and consumers have been devastated by the foreclosure
crisis. 16
Since the inception of the 2008 financial crisis, the decline in the real
estate market has also adversely affected businesses. In addition to the
skyrocketing number of residential foreclosures, defaults by commercial
real estate borrowers have also been steadily on the rise. 17 Thus, after
years of unprecedented and uninterrupted growth, the commercial real
estate market has stalled and is experiencing a free-fall spiral into the
abyss of mortgage foreclosures. 18 In some instances, commercial loans
have defaulted because the property is no longer generating income
sufficient to pay the property’s debt service and operating costs. 19 In
other circumstances, the property may be able to cover current
expenses, but the loan has matured with no new financing options on
the horizon. 20 Regardless of the cause, commercial real estate
foreclosures are becoming all too familiar in today’s stricken
economy. 21
Similar to many other jurisdictions, the foreclosure of commercial
real property in Illinois may take several months to more than a year to
complete. In the Prairie State, the process of instituting and processing
a commercial foreclosure action is set forth in the Illinois Mortgage
Foreclosure Law (IMFL). 22 In order to protect and preserve the value
of the property during the foreclosure process, many mortgagees seek
the appointment of a receiver to manage and operate the property. 23
Many mortgagors challenge the appointment, arguing that it will cause
harm to them and the property, inhibit their ability to market the
property to prospective tenants, or that they are in a much better
position to manage the property than a receiver. Thus, in this
2011, at A1.
16. See generally G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, ROBIN SMITH & DAVID PRICE, THE URBAN INST.,
THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 1–20 (May 2009), available
at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411909_impact_of_forclosures.pdf (discussing the impact
of foreclosures on families and communities).
17. Hui-yong Yu, Office Vacancy Rate in U.S. Climbs to 17-Year High as Jobs Recovery
Slows, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (July 5, 2010, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201007-06/office-vacancy-rate-in-u-s-climbs-to-17-year-high-as-jobs-recovery-slows.html.
18. Alfred G. Adams, Jr. & Jason C. Kirkham, The Real Estate Lender’s Updated Guide to
Single Asset Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 1 (2009).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1101 to 5/15-1706 (2012).
23. TERRANCE J. EVANS, COMPLEX COMMERCIAL FORECLOSURE ISSUES: A REVIEW OF
CALIFORNIA FORECLOSURE LAW REGARDING POSSESSION AND RECEIVERSHIP 56–57 (2011).
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atmosphere of real estate and economic debacle, commercial
mortgagees have increasingly resorted to pursuing their legal rights in
court to protect their investments. 24
Illustrative of this point is that in Cook County alone, there are nearly
80,000 pending foreclosure actions. 25 As a result of this volume of
cases, a considerable amount of court time is occupied with the hearing
and disposition of motions that arise incident to mortgage foreclosures.
A significant number of these motions are related to the appointment of
receivers. By far the most important question that surfaces during the
course of a commercial foreclosure is whether a receiver should be
appointed over the mortgaged property. The practical effect of such
appointment is to take from the mortgagor his right of possession, as
well as his rents and profits.
Courts regularly grant petitions for appointment of a receiver in
commercial foreclosure cases. This tendency is due to a strong
presumption in favor of the mortgagee, and the difficulty of the
mortgagor to overcome this presumption. As commercial property
foreclosures continue to disrupt economic progress, many questions
remain as to the issue of receiverships in Illinois. For instance: How
have the courts of Chancery dealt with this contemporary development?
What form or shape does equity take in this modern dilemma of
mortgage defaults? How does the chancellor equitably balance the
conflicting interest of the mortgagee in the secured debt and the interest
of the mortgagor in the property? If answers to these questions do not
readily appear in the present day statute or case law, then perhaps the
past will serve as an enlightened guide as to how to equitably resolve
the modern day hardships befalling the parties in a commercial
mortgage foreclosure cause of action.
Historically, the jurisdiction exercised in the appointment of receivers
has been treated as a purely equitable one, and the remedy has generally
been regarded as the most efficient and salutary of the extraordinary
remedies known to courts of equity. Finding its origins in the English
Court of Chancery, it was always regarded as one of its most efficient
remedies, although granted with caution and only upon a satisfactory
showing of the necessity for immediate court interposition. 26 An
24. Id. at 56.
25. HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. EVANS & HONORABLE MOSHE JACOBIUS, CIRCUIT COURT OF
COOK CNTY., CHANCERY DIVISION MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM:
PROGRESS REPORT 5 (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/
Chancery%20Division/Forclosure%20Mediation/Foreclosure%20Mediation%20Progress%20Rep
ort%20June%202012%20(with%20Appendixes).pdf.
26. JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RECEIVERS 59–60 (4th ed. 1910).
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American judge sitting in equity has strong ties to the procedures and
the traditions of the English courts of Chancery. Thus, a preliminary
examination of the development of equity jurisdiction and the
appointment of receivers may be helpful to better understand the current
doctrines and presumptions applicable today in Illinois courts of equity.
This historical reflection on our legal past may also provide some
insight into why the appointment of a receiver is deemed one of the
most revered and useful of the equitable remedies available in mortgage
foreclosure matters. This reverence calls for an exploration and
examination into the evolution of equity and the court from which the
concept of receiverships derived. As this Article strives to articulate,
equity and the application of justice in disputed matters is indeed a
result of centuries of historical development. An appreciation of this
history may prove helpful to better understand the reasoning and
rationale behind a chancellor’s decision-making process during
receivership proceedings.
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, “The life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience.” 27 Hopefully, this insight into
past experiences will provide a perch from which to view what may
possibly lie ahead in this area of law. This Article, while attempting to
be descriptive and informative, is not prescriptive, and certainly makes
no pretense of being the final word on Illinois receivership law. Rather,
it is offered as a framework for analyzing the development and current
status of one of equity’s most durable and evolving remedies: the
appointment of a receiver.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE COURTS OF CHANCERY
Thus, in the midst of the mud and at the heart of the fog, sits the Lord
High Chancellor in his High Court of Chancery. 28

– Charles Dickens
A. Anglo-Saxon Influence on the Common Law
The Anglo-Saxon era is the period of English history spanning from
550 A.D. to the Norman Conquest in 1066. 29 Anglo-Saxon law
generally refers to the legal system that prevailed in England for
approximately five centuries before the Norman invasion. 30 English
27.
28.
29.
30.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
CHARLES DICKENS, THE BLEAK HOUSE 4 (1853).
FRANK M. STENTON, ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND viii, at 580 (3d ed. 1971).
Anthony D’Amato & Stephen B. Presser, Anglo-Saxon Law, in 1 THE GUIDE TO
AMERICAN LAW: EVERYONE’S LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 251, 251 (1st ed. 1983), available at
http://anthonydamato.law.northwestern.edu/encyclopedia/anglo-saxon-law.pdf.
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common law arose from a variety of influences, including Anglo-Saxon,
Norman, and Roman law.31 The term “common law,” however, did not
arise until the twelfth century, but the idea of a received body of
customary case law dates back to the Anglo-Saxon period. 32 Since all
existing common law nations derive their legal traditions from England,
its historical legal development is of special interest to our
understanding of American jurisprudence. 33
Anglo-Saxon law was fundamentally customary in nature and
evolved into a form which survives, in some respects, in English and
American common law. 34 After the American Revolution, the
American Colonies, as well as the Federal Government, modeled their
constitutions after British common law. 35 Thus, many of the decisions
rendered in the colonial and American courts were based on precedents
established by the “Common Law” of England, which was derived from
Anglo-Saxon law. 36
The Anglo-Saxon society was predominantly rural and organized into
tribes and clans. The society was a simple, agricultural one and, except
for the merchant class, there was little trade or business. 37 The
economic conditions of the period were not conducive to the
development of a law of contracts. 38 Anglo-Saxon law, accordingly,
was a tribal law, one of popular custom, rather than a law developed and
interpreted by a technically trained class of jurists. 39 Early AngloSaxon law was quite simple, consisting mostly of a collection of
punishments or damages prescribed for various offenses. 40 Alfred the
Great compiled these prescribed judgments in his “dome-book,” also
known as the Liber Judicalis. 41 An examination of the Anglo-Saxon
law provides little, if no, reference to a law of contracts.
There are significant differences of opinion among historians as to
whether contract law existed during the Anglo-Saxon era. 42 Sir
31. Daniel J. Castellano, Common Law and Civil Jurisprudence, ARCANEKNOWLEDGE.ORG
(2009), http://www.arcaneknowledge.org/histpoli/commoncivil.htm.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. D’Amato & Presser, supra note 30, at 251.
35. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S. 198 (Kermit Hall ed.,
2005).
36. D’Amato & Presser, supra note 30, at 252.
37. 1 WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 7, at 10 (1920).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Castellano, supra note 31.
41. Id.
42. Burton F. Brody, Anglo-Saxon Contract Law: A Social Analysis, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 270,
270 (1969).
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Fredrick Pollack and his colleague Frederic William Maitland assert
that the Anglo-Saxon contract, if it existed at all, was extremely
rudimentary. 43 Their conclusion is based upon the primitive economy
of the period and the resultant lack of need for the means of commercial
exchange. 44 Professor William Searle Holdsworth is equally certain
there was no Anglo-Saxon contract law because of the unavailability of
ways to enforce the law. 45 Professor Harold Hazeltine, however, is
quite confident that pre-Norman England made use of the contract.46
The codes did recognize the contract of sale, but they recognized it
primarily for the purpose of indicating the means by which one could
protect himself from personal liability in case he purchased stolen
property. 47
A change to Anglo-Saxon law took place when the Vikings occupied
England during the early eleventh century, and as a result, some of the
Danish laws were incorporated into the English legal system. 48 Among
these was the sworn jury, composed of twelve nobles. 49 The jury only
gathered facts and did not decide guilt or innocence. 50 Rather, the
judgment was rendered through trial by ordeal, 51 as was the custom in
the Anglo-Saxon system. 52 The Scandinavian control over the British
Isles ended by 1042. 53
Anglo-Saxon rule was restored under Edward the Confessor, 54 and he
re-established the legal system implemented by Alfred the Great.
Edward also incorporated much of Danish law in the Anglo-Saxon legal
system, as Scandinavian jurisprudence was recognized and followed in

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. PAGE, supra note 37, § 8, at 11.
48. Castellano, supra note 31.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The Trial by Ordeal, UVU.EDU, http://research.uvu.edu/mcdonald/Anglo-Saxon/laws2/
trial_ordeal.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (“In order for the Anglo-Saxons to determine if a
person was guilty or not guilty, they had what was called a Trial by Ordeal. This meant that the
accused had to prove that he was innocent, usually by a physical hardship.”). It is interesting to
note that one of the ways a trial by ordeal was conducted was “to place a stone in the bottom of a
boiling bucket of water . . . [and have] [t]he accused . . . reach down into the water, grab the
stone, and then bring his/her hand back out of the water.” Id. After three days, if the hand was
healing, the person was innocent, however, if the hand was infected or still damaged, the person
was deemed guilty. Id.
52. Castellano, supra note 31.
53. Id.
54. See id. (noting that Edward the Confessor ruled from 1042 to 1066 A.D.).
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Britain’s eastern counties. 55 At the time when the Normans landed on
the shores of England, there was a regular judiciary in place and an
Anglo-Saxon law based on a system of courts: one being the “county
court,” which was held twice a year; 56 and the “hundred court,”
appointed to meet every four weeks. 57 These open-air forums were the
courts where the people could appear to receive justice. 58 Regardless of
one’s stature in the Anglo-Saxon community—whether rich or poor—
all had to come forth to assert a claim to have a wrong made right. 59
The procedure of presenting a lawsuit in an Anglo-Saxon court was a
highly formal affair. “Any mistake could result in the suit being lost.” 60
The plaintiff in a lawsuit commenced the action by swearing an oath,
making the accusation, and then having the defendant summoned to
appear in court to answer the charges. 61 The court, however, would
first determine whether the alleged offense warranted the court’s time.62
If the court accepted the validity of the plaintiff’s claim, a date would be
set on which the defendant would be scheduled to appear. 63 The basic
principle of the law was that the “[d]enial was always considered
stronger than the accusation,” so in many instances the defendant would
be allowed to bring forth an oath to prove his innocence. 64 “Oathhelpers” could also testify to the defendant’s innocence. Interestingly,
the oath-helpers were not required to give any evidence or
information. 65 The court held that the oath-helpers would know the
facts behind the case as well as anyone else, which is why there was no
need for them to present evidence. 66 “The severity of the charge
determined how many oath-helpers were needed to prove [the
defendant’s] innocence.” 67 If the defendant’s guilt was established then
55. Id.
56. 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 47 (Liberty Fund reprint 2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2010) (1898), available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2313/Pollock_1541-01_LFeBk.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 47.
60. See Ellen M. Amatangelo & Sarah L. Haggen, Anglo Saxon Laws, http://research.uvu.edu/
mcdonald//Anglo-Saxon/laws.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
61. Id. This oath was: “In the name of Almighty God, so I stand here by _____ in true
witness, unbidden and unbought, as I saw with my eyes and heard with ears that which I
pronounce with him.” Id. The defendant would also swear an oath that stated: “By the Lord, I
am guiltless both of deed and instigation of the crime with which _____ charges me.” Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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a sentence would be imposed. Anglo-Saxon England did not have an
organized system for incarceration. 68 Therefore, most punishments
were in the form of a fine and the law codes often listed the amounts to
be paid. 69 “Even killing someone could be covered by a fine if there
were mitigating circumstances.” 70 The court had lists indicating the
worth of a person’s life based upon his social status. 71 The offenses
were treated as private wrongs or torts rather than as crimes.
Some crimes, however, were known as bootless crimes, 72 for which
no compensation could be offered: arson, house-breaking, open theft,
and treachery to one’s lord were considered bootless. The only
punishment was death and forfeiture of property to the king. 73 In some
instances of forfeiture, the king would take the issues and distribute the
land to his churches or to his nobles. 74 Thus, it appears that the AngloSaxon view of protecting and maintaining forfeited property was to
arbitrarily seize the land without just consideration as to who was
entitled to the property. As stated previously, the law of contracts was
virtually nonexistent in Anglo-Saxon Britain and “the law of property
depended principally upon possession.” 75
Traditionally, in Anglo-Saxon society, the law of property was not
written, but rather carried out based on long-standing customs.76
Anglo-Saxon customs and code did not deal with ownership. 77 Rather,
possession was the leading conception for Anglo-Saxon law. 78 It was
possession of the land that had to be “defended or recovered, and to
[have possession] without dispute, or by judicial award after a dispute
. . . [was] the only sure foundation of title and end of strife.” 79 “A right
to possess, distinct from actual possession, must be admitted if there is
any rule of judicial redress at all; but it is only through the conception of
that specific right that ownership finds any place in [Anglo-Saxon
law].” 80 It is these views of possession, possessory rights, and remedies
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. JOYCE TALLY LIONARONS, THE HOMILETIC WRITINGS OF ARCHBISHOP WULFSTAN 171
(2010).
73. Ben Levick, The Anglo-Saxon Fyrd 878–1066 A.D., REGIAANGLORUM (Mar. 31, 2003),
http://www.regia.org/fyrd2.htm.
74. STENTON, supra note 29, at 499.
75. D’Amato & Presser, supra note 30, at 252.
76. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 63.
77. Id. at 55–56.
78. Id. at 56.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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that are still part of our common law today. 81 Although American
common law may have descended from the Anglo-Saxons, there is no
evidence of Anglo-Saxon courts employing the legal concept of equity
in relation to property rights.
Thus, before the Norman Conquest, there were no separate
ecclesiastical courts in England to determine questions pertaining to
usage and ownership of land. 82 Although there appears to be some
evidence of forfeitures occurring in the English realm prior to the arrival
of William the Conqueror, there was no organized structure in place to
resolve these issues. 83 The arrival of the Normans had an enormous
impact on the question of landholding in England. 84 “[A]t the time of
the conquest in 1066, English law was already an amalgam of AngloSaxon, Dane, and canon law,” which merged to become Anglo-Saxon
law. 85 After the Battle of Hastings, 86 the combination of Anglo-Saxon
and Norman law emerged as English common law and ultimately gave
rise to the courts of Chancery and the concept of equity.
B. Norman Influence on English Law
Following the invasion of 1066, William the Conqueror began to
establish control over England by creating a more centralized form of
government.87 As King of England, William became the head of the
administration. In fact, the highest court in the land was the “curia
regis,” or king’s court, where the king himself often heard causes and
pronounced judgments. 88 William’s direct involvement in the court’s
activities created a trend toward more royal control of the
administration of justice. 89 His tendency to interfere more frequently,
however, resulted in proactive instead of reactive changes to the law.90
Although the Normans maintained the legal system with minor
adjustments, they brought change in the area that mattered most to the

81. Id.
82. Sir Frederick Pollock, English Law before The Norman Conquest, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1907), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?
Itemid=284&id=1167&option=com_content&task=view.
83. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 51.
84. STENTON, supra note 29, at 499.
85. Castellano, supra note 31.
86. HUGH M. THOMAS, NORMAN CONQUEST: ENGLAND AFTER WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR
37 (Pub. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008).
87. 1 RALPH EWING CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS,
NORMAN INFLUENCE ON OLD ANGLO-SAXON LAW § 2 (3d ed. 1992).
88. Id.
89. THOMAS, supra note 86, at 86.
90. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 69.
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new elites—issues pertaining to the control of the land. 91 The
Normans, having replaced the governing Anglo-Saxon aristocracy and
desiring to legitimize and consolidate their own rule, altered the
landholding customs of England. 92 Initially, William’s claim to the
English throne was based on Edward the Confessor naming him his
successor in 1051 (stemming from William’s support of Edward’s
reclamation of the throne in 1042).93 William’s claim marked a
departure from English custom, as the act of bequeathing the kingdom
was without precedent in England. 94 The notion that all English lands
belonged to William is evident in the landholding policies he chose to
implement and enforce. This power allowed William to redistribute
lands to his favored men, who then became tenants. 95 “As part of this
redistribution[,] the men would negotiate their feudal obligations on a
personal level with the king[,] who was now head of this tenurial
hierarchy.” 96 William “exercised this control to establish a largely
Norman aristocracy.” 97
The Norman adherence to the ideals of feudalism played a significant
role in land laws. Thus, the question of aristocratic landholding was an
area of major importance to the Norman feudal lords. In time, their new
landholding system and inheritance practices brought about greater
changes to the administration of justice in England than they had
originally intended. 98 British courts would eventually establish longterm variations in the administration of property law, stemming in large
part from a progressive reliance on justice from the king.
C. The Development of Chancery in England
William, now reigning supreme as the head of all the English courts,
proclaimed the law of England would pass under the domain of a
system of writs from the royal Chancery. 99 Originally, the foremost
tool for control and governance was the Chancery in England.100 The
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id.
COURTNEY STANHOPE KENNY, THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF PRIMOGENITURE IN
ENGLAND AND ITS EFFECT UPON LANDED PROPERTY, RISE OF THE LAW OF PRIMOGENITURE IN
ENGLAND AFTER THE NORMAN CONQUEST 9 (1878).
96. Norman Conquest: Continuity or Change?, TOTAL WAR CTR. (Mar. 7, 2011, 1:33 AM)
http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=431323.
97. Id.
98. THOMAS, supra note 86, at 87.
99. CLARK, supra note 87, § 2.
100. Timothy S. Haskett, The Medieval English Court of Chancery, 14 LAW & HIST. REV.
245, 246 (1996).
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Chancellor was an officer of the government and a minister of the
crown, and most of the men who held the post in the Middle Ages were
bishops and archbishops. 101 The king’s Chancellors were chosen from
the king’s court, which consisted mostly of ecclesiastics. 102 The
Chancellor derived power from his custody of the great seal and from
his preeminent position in the king’s council. 103
Although the Chancery was not originally a court, signs of judicial
activity began to appear in several of its activities. Because the
Chancery issued royal grants, any questions relating to them would be
presented to the Chancellor. In establishing the rules of common law,
the Chancery intended such rules to exist for time immemorial;
therefore the procedure was inflexible and stringent. 104 The rigidity of
common law remedies eventually led to the denial of justice on many
occasions, prompting litigants to appeal to the king (who was deemed
the source of all English justice) for additional relief. In his absence,
the king entrusted these matters to his Chancellor. The early
chancellors were preeminent churchmen—the most literate of medieval
society. 105
In time, a separate body of law evolved that was intended to represent
the king’s conscience and thus be more equitable and just than the
common law. In fact, the extension of the Chancellor’s jurisdiction
resulted from the Chancellor being regarded as the “keeper of the king’s
conscience”—the king being the “fountain of justice.” 106
The
emergence of a separate court of equity was also the result of some
inadequacies that existed in common law. For one, the law was void of
any apparatus “to prevent wrongs, or to force a defendant to perform a
contract or other obligation.” 107 Furthermore, some of the rules
administered in the common law courts were harsh and contrary to the
notions of fairness. There was significant emphasis upon “formalism
and ritual, particularly in the field of contracts and property law.”108
The courts tended “to insist upon a literal interpretation of anything in

101. David E. Cole, Judicial Discretion and the “Sunk Costs” Strategy of Government
Agencies, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 689, 702–03 (2003).
102. CLARK, supra note 87, § 3.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITYRESTITUTION 56–57 (1973).
106. Cole, supra note 101, at 704.
107. JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 17
n.13(1) (3d ed. 1989).
108. Id. at 17 n.13(2).
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writing.” 109 The Chancery also controlled questions concerning the
property rights of the crown. As the practice became more frequent, the
Chancellor, and the Chancery office, acquired the characteristics of a
court. 110
The Chancellor did not have any clearly defined jurisdiction. 111 The
Chancellor “exercise[ed] his equitable jurisdiction, [and was] not bound
by precedent or formal rules.” 112 Rather, he dispensed an extraordinary
justice, a function for which he was well-qualified as he was commonly
“well-versed” in both the civil and canon law. 113 In the absence of
fixed principles, the early decisions largely depended on the
Chancellor’s personal notion of right and wrong. 114 The Chancellor’s
discretionary authority “to assert jurisdiction over cases previously
decided by common law courts . . . was viewed by some as eviscerating
English statutory and common law.” 115
The Chancellors, however, did not view equity as abrogating
statutory law, but rather as simply expressing the exceptions that were
implicit in the law under certain circumstances. 116
Yet, such
articulations of the role of Chancery did not prevent people from
arguing that the Chancery courts undermined the common law
courts. 117 In light of these condemnations, the Chancellors created rules
governing Chancery courts in the 1600s. 118
Furthermore, by the early seventeenth century, Chancellors in
Chancery quite regularly relied upon precedents (as recorded in the
Chancery Register’s Books) to guide their decisions in like cases.
Though, in referencing prior decisions, Chancellors were usually
looking for similar actions on similar facts and were not necessarily
interested in the actual pronouncements of the earlier judges. 119
The Chancellor’s shift to a greater reliance on “uniformity and
109. Id.
110. Id. at 18.
111. See Cole, supra note 101, at 703–04 (noting that when a suit did not fall under the
jurisdiction of the other courts, the Chancellor would have jurisdiction because the Chancellor’s
jurisdiction eventually extended to all matters of conscience).
112. Id. at 704.
113. Id. at 703.
114. JOHN SELDEN ET AL., THE TABLE-TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (1927). This state of
affairs in Chancery became less true as the principles of equity became more fixed. Over time,
the Chancellor’s jurisdiction expanded and the “High Court of Chancery came into being.” Cole,
supra note 101, at 704.
115. Cole, supra note 101, at 704–05.
116. Id. at 706.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 707.
119. W.H.D. Winder, Precedent in Equity, 57 L. Q. REV. 245, 245–79 (1941).
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predictability in equity jurisprudence had the effect of severely binding
the Chancellor’s previously limitless discretion.” 120 This transition also
served to transform the jurisprudence of equity from an “ever-changing
practice based in the almost absolute discretion of the Chancellor” to a
“‘controlled, constrained science of equity, ancillary to commonlaw.’” 121
By 1758, the doctrines of equity had become so formalized that
Blackstone observed that courts of Chancery and equity “interpreted
statutes according to the same principles of reason and justice, and that
the unlimited discretion that had previously been characteristic of courts
of equity ‘hath totally been disclaimed by their successors.’” 122 During
this period of alteration and adaptation in English jurisprudence,
“[s]ome well-settled doctrines of equity were incorporated into English
common law and were used in common law courts.” 123
These transformative developments in England did not go unnoticed
by legal professionals in the newly constituted colonies across the
Atlantic. The settlers, in establishing the American legal system,
inherited English jurisprudence and many of Britain’s equitable
doctrines, which serve to guide our courts in the exercise of their
equitable jurisdiction. 124
D. The Establishment of Chancery in America
The early English colonists who settled in America were very
hesitant to establish Chancery courts or to create a Chancery jurisdiction
within their new colonies. 125 This reluctance stemmed in part from
their resentment of the crown and the crown’s chief officer, the
Chancellor. 126 Colonists did little to promote equity’s popularity since
“one of the most common grievances in the colonies was the arbitrary
and capricious behavior of Crown officials.” 127 Additionally, colonists
with a “strong Puritanical heritage may have resisted any law-related
120. Cole, supra note 101, at 708.
121. Id. (quoting PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 20 (1990)).
122. Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430–33).
123. Id. at 708–09.
124. Id. at 711.
125. See id. (noting that some colonies had courts of equity, some had combined courts, and
some allowed the governor’s council to hear equity cases). During America’s colonial period,
there was no permanent Chancery Court in New England or Pennsylvania. And, although a court
of Chancery was established in New York in 1701, it was so unpopular that it received very few
matters to hear.
126. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 53–54 (1921).
127. Calvin Woodward, Joseph Story and American Equity, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 623,
641 (1988).
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institution purporting to probe the consciences of men, [as the courts of
equity are apt to do].” 128 The belief among some colonialists was that
these types of forums for a democratic society were not proper or safe
because too much power was concentrated in one person.
The rationale for establishing the courts of Chancery among the
American Colonies was far from consistent or unified. In some of the
pre-American Revolution colonies, the power of equity lay with the
governor or his designated council. 129 In these colonies, “the governors
stood in the same relationship to the colon[ial] courts as did the king to
the English courts.” 130 In other colonies governed by legislative
assemblies, the colonial court held equity authority, with little concern
about how the court exercised its authority. 131 As a result, in the
eighteenth century, the organization of the courts of equity was rather
uneven across the several American colonies. 132 Some colonies had
separate courts of equity; 133 some simply removed the distinction
between common law and equity courts; and in other colonies the
governor and the governor’s council acted as the court of
Chancery. 134 In colonies that had separate courts of equity, the English
dictated the administration of such courts. This relationship created a
close association between equity jurisdiction and the executive power of
the King of England and English colonial policy. 135
After the American Colonies secured their independence from
England, the principles of the English Chancery courts continued to
influence the applicability of equity jurisprudence. One of the leading
Chancery lawyers of the period, Alexander Hamilton, was an outspoken
proponent of equitable jurisdiction in the federal courts. In defending
this jurisdictional proposal, Hamilton, using his pseudonym, “Publius,”
wrote in the Federalist Papers,
It has also been asked, what need of the word “equity”? What
equitable causes can grow out of the constitution and laws of the
128. See id. (noting that Puritans who had left England to avoid submitting their consciences
to the Anglican church would not want to have their consciences scrutinized by any
representative of the king).
129. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23,
41 (1951).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 54 (2d. ed. 1985).
133. For instance, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, and Virginia
had separate courts of equity. See GEORGE TUCKER BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A
TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY 19 (11th ed.
1934).
134. FRIEDMAN, supra note 132, at 54.
135. Id. at 54–55.
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United States? There is hardly a subject of litigation between
individuals, which may not involve those ingredients of fraud,
accident, trust, or hardship, which would render the matter an object
of equitable, rather than of legal jurisdiction, as the distinction is
known and established in several of the states. 136

Shortly after the Revolutionary War, many states’ constitutions
provided for the establishment of courts of Chancery, patterned after the
High Court of Chancery in England. 137 Some northern states, however,
such as Massachusetts and Maine, did not resolve the issue of equitable
jurisdiction until the nineteenth century. 138 In an effort to avoid the
complicated aspects of the early English bifurcated system of common
law and Chancery, some American states experimented by merging law
and equity into one court and providing for only one form of action.139
In other words, as the young nation expanded beyond the boundaries of
the original thirteen colonies, the development of equity in the United
States was slow.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORTGAGE LAW AND THE RIGHT TO REDEEM
Before continuing on this journey through the origins of
receiverships, we endeavor to take a detour to examine the development
of mortgage law and how it directly influences the way receivers are
appointed and how equity is administered. Although the mortgage has
roots in both Roman law 140 and in early Anglo-Saxon England, its most
significant developments can be seen in the English common law
mortgage and the effects of the subsequent intervention of English
equity courts on that mortgage. These developments would later have a
substantial impact on American mortgage law. 141
A. The Theory of Redemption in England
As the principle of equity was developing in England during the
1600s, the theory of redemption gradually began to emerge and evolve
into a recognized practice in Chancery. At common law, a mortgage
was a simple deed of land, which ran from the mortgagor to the
mortgagee. The mortgage operated as a conditional conveyance of
legal title to the property, thereby providing security for a debt. The

136. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 80, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
137. BISPHAM, supra note 133, at 26 (listing states, such as New York, New Jersey,
Maryland, Delaware, and South Carolina).
138. Oleck, supra note 129, at 41.
139. WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 6–7 & n.21 (5th ed. 1956).
140. H.W. Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5–8 (1890).
141. GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES §§ 1–7 (2d ed. 1970).
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formal transfer of ownership actually occurred when the mortgage was
made, at which time the mortgagee became the owner of the land. The
mortgage document set forth in detail the agreement between the
mortgagor and mortgagee, including a description of the debt it secured
and the date payment was expected, otherwise known as “law day.” 142
Payment made the mortgage null and void. A lack of compliance,
however, could result in dire consequences for the mortgagor.
Prior to the advent of Chancery, the courts of law stringently
enforced the mortgage as it was written. In the event the mortgagor
failed to satisfy the debt on the precise date and for the exact amount as
set forth in the mortgage agreement, the mortgagee became the
unconditional owner of the land. In the event of a default, the
mortgagor would irrevocably forfeit the land to the mortgagee. This
rule was absolute; thus, time was of the essence. No foreclosure
process existed and no other legal actions were necessary since the very
nature of the original conveyance of title established the mortgagee as
the owner of the property upon the mortgagor’s default. In other words,
regardless of the circumstances, failure to pay the mortgage debt when
due extinguished all of the mortgagor’s interest in the property and the
mortgagee’s interest in the estate became complete. 143 It was from this
strict enforcement of the rule of forfeiture that the mortgagor sought
judicial relief.
In time, the mortgagors who lost their land through default would
petition the king for assistance. The petition would pray that the king
order the mortgagee (the new owner of the land) to accept the late
proffered funds and return the land to the mortgagor. 144 Initially, the
relief granted to the mortgagor was based on a finding of extraordinary
circumstances, such as fraud, accident, mistake, impossibility, or
oppression. 145 Subsequent to a hearing, in many instances, the
mortgagee was ordered to convey the property back to the mortgagor.
In other words, even though the mortgagee’s rights at law were fixed
and absolute, the mortgagor who had the financial capability to tender
the amount due and owing could retrieve the property after law day, so
long as the failure to pay fell within one of the extraordinary
circumstances. As the number of petitions increased, the king
142. Robert Kratovil, Mortgages—Problems in Possession, Rents, and Mortgagee Liability,
11 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 2 (1961).
143. Under common law, there was no right to redemption or reinstatement. This outcome,
however, ignores the true nature of the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship, which is one of lenderborrower. Id. at 1.
144. Id. at 2.
145. OSBORNE, supra note 141, § 6.
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increasingly referred the petitions to his high official, the Lord
Chancellor. 146 Because the king was the “fountain of all justice,” it was
the “Chancellor’s duty to dispose of these petitions justly and equitably,
according to good conscience.” 147 By 1625, the king had completely
delegated the hearing of all the petitions to his Lord Chancellor. 148 As a
result, the mortgagors would directly present the petitions to the
Chancellor who now presided as a jurist in Chancery. What started as
an act of mercy by the king had quickly become an accepted practice
within the realm. 149
In 1615, in the cause of Emanuel College v. Evans, although a
mortgagor failed to present any traditional equitable defenses, the court
of Chancery granted relief to the mortgagor even though the debt had
not been satisfied by law day. 150 Therefore, where any form of
hardship prevented the mortgagor from satisfying the debt, the
Chancellor would order the mortgagee to accept the late payment and
convey the property back to the mortgagor. 151 By the seventeenth
century, the granting of such equitable relief became more common.152
Thus, the mortgagor was able, as a matter of course, to exercise the
right to redeem the land from the mortgagee if the amount due was
tendered within a reasonable time after law day. 153 Over time,
mortgagors no longer needed to assert specific grounds for relief.154
The mortgagee would be jailed for failing to comply with the
Chancellor’s order. 155 Under this new view of equity, the mortgagor’s
default would not automatically vest title in the mortgagee despite the
language of the original conveyance.
The shift in equity that began to take hold was based on the
Chancellor’s awareness that the mortgagees had rights to the payment
of the debt, but that their property was merely security for the
indebtedness. 156 The courts of Chancery also came to realize that if a
mortgagor was ready, willing, and able to pay, it would be forfeiture to
allow mortgagees to keep the land solely because the mortgagor’s
146. Kratovil, supra note 142, at 2.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Emanuel Coll. v. Evans, 21 Eng. Rep. 494, 495 (Ct. Ch. 1615).
151. Kratovil, supra note 142, at 2.
152. Id.
153. Andrew R. Berman, “Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage”—The Use (and Misuse of)
Mezzanine Loans and Preferred Equity Investments, 11 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 76, 86 (2005).
154. OSBORNE, supra note 140, § 6.
155. Kratovil, supra note 142, at 2.
156. Berman, supra note 153, at 87.
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payment was late. 157 This view signaled reluctance by the courts of
Chancery to enforce forfeiture provisions. 158 Therefore, by permitting
the defaulting mortgagor to satisfy the debt after the default and recover
the property, Chancery courts established what became known as the
equitable right of redemption, or the equity of redemption. 159
The emergence of the equity of redemption clearly demonstrated
Chancery’s willingness to examine the true essence of the debt
transaction rather than focusing exclusively on the formal structure of
the secured loan. By examining “the intent rather than the form, the
court protected the parties’ reasonable expectations.” 160 Clearly, the
mortgagee “expected to be repaid the debt with interest in a reasonably
timely manner, and the borrower expected to recover its mortgaged
property upon payment of the outstanding debt.” 161 The Chancellors
recognized that after the mortgagor paid the mortgagee, the lenderborrower relationship ended, and the mortgagee no longer had any
rights to the property or against the mortgagor. 162 Under this new
concept, even though the mortgagee became the full owner of the land
upon default, the mortgagor could re-acquire ownership by making
redemption. In creating this new doctrine, the Chancellor provided
equitable relief for the mortgagor attempting to cure the default rather
than focusing exclusively on the language of the mortgage agreement.
The equity of redemption doctrine, though, did not gain prominence
overnight. 163 Rather, it developed over time and “only as the result of a
very long succession of decisions, in repeated instances.” 164 The relief
once rendered in exceptional circumstances had become the rule.
Courts began following equity of redemption as a matter of course; the
cases where a court granted no relief had become a rare exception. 165
As the mortgagor’s equitable right to redeem gained acceptance and
became a recognized doctrine, mortgagees attempted to circumvent it by
inserting clauses in mortgage agreements stating that the mortgagor
waived and surrendered his right to exercise the equitable remedy. The
Chancery courts, however, found such provisions to be void and having
no effect—the rationale being that a needy and wanting mortgagor

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 87–88.
Id. at 88.
Kratovil, supra note 142, at 2–3.
Berman, supra note 153, at 88.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 86 & n.47.
Chaplin, supra note 140, at 10.
Berman, supra note 153, at 86.
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would sign anything, and it was incumbent upon the courts to protect
the disadvantaged party in the transaction. 166 Any language in the
mortgage purporting to terminate the mortgagor’s interest in the
property in the event of a default was deemed absolutely null and
void. 167 As a result of this new concept, mortgagees began turning to
the Chancery courts for relief. 168
In some instances, this new equitable remedy intended to protect the
interest of the defaulting mortgagor resulted in an uncertain timetable as
to when the issue of ownership would be resolved. When a default
occurred, the mortgagee became the owner of the property, but for a
seemingly uncertain period given that the mortgagor might choose to
redeem at any time. This new right allowed the mortgagor, in some
cases, to pay the indebtedness months after the default.
The courts of Chancery soon recognized that the mortgagor’s right to
redeem could not be limitless. 169 These courts therefore established a
new practice to create more certainty for the parties involved. Upon
default, the mortgagee would be permitted to file a petition, and the
Chancellor would grant a decree allowing the mortgagor to pay the debt
within a reasonable amount of time. 170 If the mortgagor did not satisfy
the debt within the time specified—usually six months or a year—the
decree provided the mortgagor’s equitable right of redemption was
barred and foreclosed. 171 As a result, the foreclosure suit, which barred
or terminated the equitable right of redemption, came into existence.
The effect of this process would leave the mortgagee with good title in
the mortgaged property. 172 However, if the value of the mortgaged
property exceeded the amount owed, the mortgagee obtained a
windfall. 173 The courts of Chancery, in realizing the inequity of this
practice, sought to establish more equitable rights for mortgagors. 174
In order to curb the potential inequitable windfall, Chancellors began
completing the foreclosure process by way of a public sale. 175 If the
property sold for more than the amount due under the debt, the
166. Kratovil, supra note 142, at 3.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 3–4. It is important to note that, since the equitable right to redemption was a
creation of a court of equity rather than a court of law, the mortgagee had to bring the issue in a
court of equity.
169. Berman, supra note 153, at 88 & n.60.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. OSBORNE, supra note 141, § 6, at 12.
173. Berman, supra note 153, at 89.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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mortgagee would then be compensated in full, and any surplus would
allow the mortgagor to salvage the losses sustained as a result of the
foreclosure. The foreclosure sale protected both the mortgagor’s equity
in the mortgaged property and the mortgagee’s right to be repaid. 176 In
due course, as foreclosure by sale became the accepted practice, a new
perspective emerged: a mortgage was a lien on the land and not a deed
of conveyance. Under this view, the mortgage lien permitted a public
sale to raise funds to satisfy the mortgage debt. As a result, in the event
of a mortgagor’s default, the mortgagee would seek to safeguard and
secure the investment—oftentimes through the appointment of
receiver. 177 Such was the condition of the mortgage and the right to
redeem when it came to America.
B. The Right to Redeem in Illinois
When a mortgagor becomes delinquent on the mortgage, one factor
that affects the timeframe during which the mortgagee can foreclose is
the redemption right. 178 A redemption right is the right of the
mortgagor to redeem the property by satisfying the entire balance of the
mortgage. A redemption period is the period of time during which the
mortgagor may exercise redemption rights. In Illinois, the mortgagor’s
right to redeem throughout the years has been modified, altered,
reduced, and in some respects, completely eradicated. These variations
have had a considerable impact on the applicability of receiverships.
In 1841, the Illinois legislature passed the “Redemption by
Defendant” Act. 179 The Act, which was subsequently amended in
1895, provided that a defendant may, within twelve months after the
foreclosure sale, redeem the real estate sold by paying the purchaser the
sum of money for which the premises was sold. 180 Pursuant to section
20 of the Act, any decree or judgment creditor was permitted to redeem,
provided that such redemption was exercised after the expiration of
twelve months and within fifteen months after the sale. 181 The early
decisions pertaining to the appointment of a receiver held that during
the period of redemption, the mortgagor was entitled to possession and
the enjoyment of the income from the property, except for the purpose

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Smith-Hurd, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1896, Judgments ch. 77, § 18, at 2353 (describing
the details of the redemption process, including who may redeem, from whom, and the method of
interest calculation).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. § 20, at 2358; Chi. Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Coleman, 119 N.E. 587, 588 (Ill. 1918).
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of satisfying the deficiency judgment on the foreclosed mortgage.182
Thus, during the redemption period, unless there was a deficiency
judgment, a receivership after a foreclosure sale was improper except
where the mortgagor was destroying the property. 183 As a result of this
prevailing view, the receiver was not warranted in using the income for
any other purpose—not even in paying property taxes. 184
Under current Illinois law, the right of redemption is guaranteed for
residential properties. In fact, the statutory language explicitly states
that any attempt to waive this right for residential properties is void. 185
The same restriction is not available for commercial properties; and
oftentimes, commercial mortgages contain an expressed provision that
waives redemption rights. 186 Under the IMFL, courts are required to
give full force and effect to a clear, express waiver provision. 187 This
aspect of the IMFL lends greater certainty to the foreclosure process
because a bidder at the judicial sale will no longer have to risk having
the purchase defeated by an eleventh-hour mortgagor seeking to redeem
the property.
C. Three Theories of Mortgage Law in Illinois
Illinois courts have recognized, at one time or another, one of three
theories of mortgage law—title, lien, and intermediate. Under the title
theory, legal “title” to the mortgaged property remains in the mortgagee
until the mortgage debt is satisfied or foreclosed. 188 Under the lien
theory, the mortgagee owns only a security interest in the property
while both legal and equitable titles remain with the mortgagor until
182. See, e.g., Haigh v. Carroll, 71 N.E. 317, 319 (Ill. 1904) (“The general rule under such
circumstances is that the owner of the equity of redemption is entitled to the possession of the
premises, and the rents and profits accruing therefrom, during the period of redemption . . . .”).
The Haigh court based its restatement of this “general rule” on four prior Illinois Supreme Court
decisions: Davis v. Dale, 37 N.E. 215 (Ill. 1894); Stevens v. Hadfield, 52 N.E. 875 (Ill. 1899);
Bogardus v. Moses, 54 N.E. 984 (Ill. 1899); and Lightcap v. Bradley, 58 N.E. 221 (Ill. 1900).
183. Davis, 37 N.E. at 216.
184. Hadfield, 63 N.E. at 634.
185. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1601(a) (2012).
186. Id. § 1601(b) (providing that the mortgagor “may waive [its] right of redemption . . . by
express waiver stated in the mortgage” or “by any other waiver in writing which has been
acknowledged by the mortgagor and recorded”). But see id. § 1601(a) (stating that a mortgagor
of residential real estate may not waive this right, and any such waiver is deemed void).
187. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Sav. Ass’n v. Dwinn, No. 90 C 1076, 1990 WL 141451, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1990). See also Commercial Mortg. & Fin. Co. v. Woodcock Const. Co., 200
N.E.2d 923, 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964) (finding that the ability to waive the right of redemption is
statutorily provided and must be honored).
188. See In re Young, 22 B.R. 620, 622 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982) (describing how the contours
of state law affect the application of 11 U.S.C. § 1322 and acknowledging and defining Illinois’s
adoption of the “title theory”).
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foreclosure. Under the intermediate theory, legal and equitable title
remains with the mortgagor until a default, at which time legal title
passes to the mortgagee. Each theory has influenced how courts of
equity have dealt with the request for the appointment of a receiver.
Illinois courts originally followed the title theory of mortgages. Early
cases recognized the common law precept that a mortgage was a
conveyance of a legal estate vesting title to the property in the
mortgagee. 189 Under this theory, the practical benefit to the mortgagee
was the right to take possession of the property upon default through an
action of ejectment. 190 Based on this then-prevailing principle in
Illinois, the mortgagee could not have a receiver appointed on default
by the mortgagor, since the mortgagee was then entitled to
possession. 191 In following the title theory, Illinois courts of equity
would enforce the equitable theory of mortgages. That is to say, while
the law courts would give the mortgagee the right to take possession of
the property at any time, the mortgagor could go into a court of equity
and force the mortgagee to account for any income the mortgagee
obtained while in possession of the property. This equitable accounting
was enforced so strictly that there was little or no advantage to the
mortgagee in taking possession from the mortgagor. 192 However, if the
property were to come within the jurisdiction of a court of Chancery
because of a bill to foreclose, the mortgagee could seek relief in equity.
The appointment of a receiver, however, would not be allowed to aid
the mortgagee in enforcing a common law right or remedy unless other
equitable remedies had failed. 193
In 1954, Kling v. Ghilarducci marked a shift in how Illinois courts
viewed mortgage law. In Kling, the court held:
189. See Rohrer v. Deatherage, 168 N.E. 266, 268 (Ill. 1929) (“In this state a mortgagor is the
legal owner of the mortgaged premises against all persons except the mortgagee and his
assigns.”); Lightcap v. Bradley, 58 N.E. 221, 223 (Ill. 1900) (describing the nature of mortgage in
the English tradition as a transfer of title and noting Illinois’s adoption of that conception).
190. CLARK, supra note 87, § 936(a), at 1704 (“After condition broken, ejectment may be
maintained by the mortgagee against the mortgagor . . . .” (quoting Taylor v. Adams, 4 N.E. 837
(Ill. 1886))).
191. Altschuler v. Sandelman, 264 Ill. App. 106, 114 (1931). In Sandelman, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated,
“If a man has a legal mortgage, he cannot have a receiver appointed; he has nothing to
do but to take possession. If he has only an equitable mortgage, that is, if there is a
prior mortgagee, then, if the prior mortgagee is not in possession, the other may have a
receiver, without prejudice to his taking possession[] . . . .”
Id. at 115 (quoting Berney v. Sewell, (1820) 37 Eng. Rep. 515 (H.C. Ch.) 515; 1 Jac. & W. 647,
648) (emphasis omitted).
192. WILLIAM A. CHASE, SAMUEL MACCLINTOCK & HENRY P. WILLIS, HIGHER
ACCOUNTANCY, PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE: BUSINESS LAW § 2, at 292 (1911).
193. Schack v. McKay, 97 Ill. App. 460, 465 (1901).
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In Illinois the giving of a mortgage is not a separation of title, for the
holder of the mortgage takes only a lien there under. After foreclosure
of a mortgage until delivery of the master’s deed under the foreclosure
sale, purchaser acquires no title to the land either legal or equitable.
Title in the land sold under mortgage foreclosure remains in the
mortgagor . . . until the expiration of the redemption period and
conveyance by the master’s deed. 194

As a result, Illinois mortgages and deeds of trust conveyed only a
qualified title to the mortgagee as security for the loan during the
existence of the debt. The mortgagor remained the owner of the
mortgaged property for all beneficial purposes, subject to the lien
created by the mortgage or deed of trust. The qualified title held by the
mortgagee was subject to the defeasance clause, 195 which stipulated that
such title must be fully conveyed, or released back to the mortgagor at
the time the debt is satisfied in full. Following the decision in Kling,
Illinois moved from being a title theory state to an intermediate theory
state until the mid-1980s.
By 1984, Illinois courts completed their transition from title theory to
lien theory. In Harms v. Sprague, the court deemed the execution of a
mortgage as a mere lien. 196 Following Harms, the second district
appellate court in Kelley/Lehr & Associates, Inc. v. O’Brien stated,
“[T]he State of Illinois has recently adopted the ‘lien theory of
mortgages,’ and a mortgagee is not deemed to own the title of the
property but only a mere lien.” 197 In the decades following Harms and
O’Brien, the existing “theory” of mortgage law has influenced what
standards Illinois courts apply to issues pertaining to the appointment of
a receiver.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF RECEIVERSHIPS
Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still. 198

– Roscoe Pound

194. Kling v. Ghilarducci, 121 N.E.2d 752, 756 (Ill. 1954).
195. A defeasance clause is “[a] mortgage provision indicating that the borrower will be given
the title to the property once all mortgage terms are met.” Defeasance Clause, INVESTOPEDIA
(last visited Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/defeasance-clause.asp#axzz2
JV1GZxyK. “The defeasance clause is not required in states using property liens as collateral for
a mortgage . . . . In this sense, the clause is a substitute for collateral.” Id.
196. Harms v. Sprague, 473 N.E.2d 930, 933 (Ill. 1984).
197. Kelley/Lehr & Assocs. v. O’Brien, 551 N.E.2d 419, 423 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
198. Dean Marshall McKusick, Uniformity of Law and Its Practical Application in the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 9 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 217 (1925).
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A. Origins of Receivers in England
It is difficult to determine when the first court appointment of a
receiver occurred in Britain. There is some evidence of the Chancery
courts granting injunctions to preserve property and prevent its misuse
during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. 199 Although this practice was
first instituted to correct the mishandling of land, it was questionable
whether the remedy of enjoining the party in possession from
committing waste or doing harm to the property was a sufficient
protection. 200 If the court’s injunction order was not observed, the
disobeying party might be punished, but this remedy often did not
restore damaged or depleted property. 201 Because the court itself could
not physically care for the property, an officer of the court was
appointed to act on the court’s behalf. The receiver collected rents and
profits associated with the land on behalf of the court, but he did not
always take possession of the property in question. The appointment of
receivers for the purpose of collecting rents and profits became an
accepted practice during the reign of Elizabeth I. 202
The early procedural practice of Chancery in England was that a
court did not appoint a receiver until after the defendant had submitted
its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint. This procedure provided courts
with an opportunity to weigh the claims of each party to the suit.
Although this practice was subsequently modified, courts stringently
required a special reason for the appointment of a receiver before the
defendant filed an answer, such as immediate danger to the property. 203
In England, the appointment of receivers was confined to the courts of
Chancery, 204 an equitable concept many of the early English settlers
carried across the Atlantic to the newly formed American Colonies. 205
B. Receiverships in Illinois
[N]o organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically
applicable to every question which may occur in practical
administration. No foresight can anticipate nor any document of

199. TODD C. KAZLOW & BRUCE C. KING, THE LAW OF MISCELLANEOUS AND COMMERCIAL
SURETY BONDS 78 (2001).
200. CLARK, supra note 87, § 4, at 4.
201. Id.
202. 1 GEORGE SPENCE, EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 673 (1846).
203. Frank v. Siegel, 263 Ill. App. 316, 323 (1931).
204. CLARK, supra note 87, § 4, at 5 (stating that this practice continued until the enactment
of the Judicature Act of 1878, which extended the jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to every
inferior court with equity jurisdiction).
205. Id.
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reasonable length contain express provisions for all possible
questions. 206

– Abraham Lincoln
On December 3, 1818, Illinois became the twenty-first state to join
the union. Previously part of the vast Northwest Territory, Illinois
would become the fifth most populous state and home to Chicago, the
third largest city in the nation. 207 Louis Jolliet, the French explorer who
discovered Illinois, wrote that the region appeared “to be the most
beautiful and most easily settled.” 208 Drawn to the richness of the new
land, settlers soon followed Jolliet to establish (as much as possible) “a
duplicate of the community they had left behind.” 209 The Illinois
prairie was conquered and settled by both pioneers and plows.
Residents of the Land of Lincoln eventually migrated en masse from the
prairie, to the city, and on to the suburbs. 210 Illinois residents’ desire to
acquire and possess land remained prevalent during the state’s early
years. It is in this backdrop that Illinois courts of equity evolved and
developed the law pertaining to receiverships, and courts of Chancery
would endeavor to address the issues arising from the appointment of a
mortgage foreclosure receiver.
Prior to 1879, “power of sale” mortgages were valid and enforceable
in Illinois. 211 In essence, the power provision in a mortgage allowed the
mortgagee, upon a default, to sell the property at a public sale without
any court proceedings. In 1879, the Illinois legislature abolished the
power of sale mortgages and provided that all real estate mortgages in
Illinois could be foreclosed at law or in Chancery. 212 Thus, the Act of
1879 required all real estate mortgages in Illinois to be foreclosed
through a judicial proceeding. In time, these proceedings would have
an effect on the law of mortgages in the Prairie State.
1. Early Chancery Decisions
The first court case on foreclosure receivers in Illinois was not

206. President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), available at http://
www.bartleby.com/124/pres31.html.
207. See generally ROBERT P. HOWARD, ILLINOIS: A HISTORY OF THE PRAIRIE STATE (1979)
(tracing the history as well as its entrance and importance to the union).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 128.
210. Id.
211. LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY 684
(1904).
212. Smith-Hurd, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1899, Mortgages, ch. 95, §§ 13, 17, at 2766, 2770.
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reported until 1878, 213 which is an indication that receivers were not
requested during the State’s early formative years. Thereafter, Illinois
developed a considerable amount of reported cases on the appointment
of a receiver. In fact, until 1987, all of the court decisions pertaining to
the appointment of a receiver were based on case law rather than on
statutory interpretation, as no statute yet governed receivers or their
appointment. The only statutory mention of receivership prior to 1987
was to non-mortgage provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (and its
predecessor, the Civil Practice Act). 214
Initially in Illinois, a receiver, as an officer of the court, was
appointed in certain cases to preserve and manage property that came
into the court’s custody. 215 Because the appointment of a receiver
would divest the owner of the property before a final hearing, the party
seeking the remedy had to clearly demonstrate to the court that
irreparable loss would otherwise result. 216 Thus, the appointment of a
receiver was viewed as an extraordinary remedy to be utilized only
when the property was in immediate danger of being wasted or
“milked” by its possessor, and only when no other remedy could
accomplish the desired result. 217 Unless the land provided inadequate
security for the mortgage, the appointment of a receiver was deemed an
unnecessary annoyance and hardship. 218 Furthermore, courts always
maintained discretion in appointing receivers, even when authorized by
statute 219 or in the face of a written agreement between the parties. In
other words, a court of equity would not appoint a receiver simply
because such an appointment was stipulated to in the mortgage. 220
In the words of Justice Stone of the Illinois Supreme Court,
appointing a receiver is:
[A] high and extraordinary remedy. The power is not arbitrary and
should be exercised with caution and only where the court is satisfied
there is imminent danger of loss if it is not exercised. The general rule
213. Haas v. Chi. Bldg. Soc’y, 89 Ill. 498 (1878).
214. Homer Carey & John W. Brabner-Smith, Studies in Realty Mortgage Foreclosures: III.
Receiverships, 27 ILL. L. REV. 717, 719 (1933). It should also be noted that as late as 1933, the
only statutory reference to the appointment of a receiver pertains to the foreclosure of a
mechanic’s lien. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, § 12 (1931) permitted appointment of a receiver in the
foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien.
215. Carey & Brabner-Smith, supra note 214, at 718–19.
216. Id. at 719.
217. Id.
218. Brick v. Hornbeck, 43 N.Y.S. 301, 301 (1897).
219. Carey & Brabner-Smith, supra note 214, at 719. Thus, even though the mortgage
contained a clause to mortgage the rents and profits, this was not a sufficient requirement for the
court to appoint a receiver in a foreclosure action.
220. Bagley v. Ill. Trust & Sav. Bank, 64 N.E. 1085, 1086 (Ill. 1902).
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is that the applicant must show . . . that the property itself, or the
income arising from it, is in danger of loss from neglect, waste,
misconduct or insolvency. 221

Courts of equity always have the power to appoint a receiver when the
debtor is insolvent, the mortgaged property provides insufficient
security for the debt, and there is good cause to believe the property will
be wasted or deteriorated in the hands of the mortgagor. 222 In Haas v.
Chicago Building Society, the earliest recorded Illinois Supreme Court
case addressing the issue of appointing a receiver, the court stated:
[T]he court of chancery may, where the security is inadequate and the
mortgagor unable to pay the deficiency, and a foreclosure proceeding
is pending, appoint a receiver, if there are circumstances of fraud or
bad faith on the part of the mortgagor, or other facts involved which
would render a denial of the relief sought inequitable and unjust. 223

The power is not arbitrary, should be exercised with caution, and
exercised only where the court is satisfied there is imminent danger of
loss to the mortgagor.
The general rule is that the applicant must show, first, that he has
either a clear right to the property itself or has some lien upon it, or
that the property constitutes a special fund to which he has a right to
resort for the satisfaction of his claim; and second, that the possession
of the property by the defendant was obtained by fraud, or that the
property itself or the income arising from it, is in danger of loss from
neglect, waste, misconduct, or insolvency. 224

The early view was that the court only had temporary custody of the
property, such that the receiver could only make such temporary repairs
as were necessary for operation of the property rather than permanent
improvements or radical changes. 225 In balancing the interests of the
parties, courts asked whether the good a receiver would accomplish
outweighed the harm a receiver would cause to the property owner, the
bondholders, or other interested parties. 226 If the court determined the
harm outweighed the benefit, then it would not appoint a receiver.
Early courts of Chancery attached great importance to the factor of
waste in determining whether to appoint a receiver, and less importance
on the insolvency of the mortgagor and the inadequacy of the security.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Frank v. Siegel, 263 Ill. App. 316, 323 (1931).
Omaha Hotel Co., v. Kountze, 107 U.S. 378, 395 (1883).
89 Ill. 498, 504 (1878).
Bagdonas v. Liberty Land & Inv. Co., 140 N.E. 49, 52 (Ill. 1923).
Carey & Brabner-Smith, supra note 214, at 719.
Id.
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2. Changes in the Early Twentieth Century
The process by which Illinois courts appointed receivers began to
shift during the early twentieth century and continued into the Great
Depression. The Chancery courts began allowing extensions to the
early customary limitations on the appointment of receivers. A
mortgagee, after filing a bill to foreclose a mortgage, was not entitled to
a receiver unless it appeared to the court that the mortgagor was
insolvent and that the security was inadequate. 227 The inquiry by courts
now pertained to whether the owner in possession would pay over the
rents collected. 228 Courts no longer were interested in whether the
mortgaged property was in immediate danger of being dissipated by the
mortgagor. 229
A provision in a mortgage that a receiver shall be appointed was
deemed to have no effect on the court’s decision-making process, since
the parties could not force the burden of administering the property
upon a court. 230 In Frank v. Siegel, the court held:
[E]ven though the trust deed conveys the rents and profits as security
and provides that a receiver of the premises may be appointed upon
default in the payment of any of the indebtedness, a receiver should
not be appointed solely upon the allegations of a bill to foreclose that
there is such a default and a general allegation that the security is
scant. 231

In Siegel, the bill alleged generally that the security was inadequate.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that in order to justify the appointment of a
receiver, it was incumbent on the complainant to present facts from
which the court could reasonably determine that the appointment was
equitably necessary. 232 As Illinois law evolved, courts attached great
importance to the insolvency of the mortgagor and the inadequacy of
the security when determining whether to appoint a receiver. Illinois
courts soon used circumstances and rulings to justify the intervention of
equity on the issue of receivership.
C. Creating the Receivership Provision in the Illinois Mortgage
Foreclosure Statute
In the construction of a law, the judge considers the intention of the
law giver as his true guide, and gives to all the parts and expressions

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Cross v. Will Cnty. Nat’l Bank, 52 N.E. 322, 323 (Ill. 1898).
Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 324.
First Nat’l Bank of Joliet v. Ill. Steel Co., 51 N.E. 200, 202 (Ill. 1898).
263 Ill. App. 316, 324–25 (1931) (Gridley, J. et al., concurring).
Id. at 323.
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of the law, the meaning which will effect, instead of defeating, its
intention. 233

– Thomas Jefferson
In 1987, the Illinois legislature passed the IMFL, which altered the
process, procedures, presumptions, and practice applicable to the
appointment of mortgage foreclosure receivers. The new statute was
largely intended to clarify foreclosure law and serve as a procedural
guide for Illinois courts. 234 Yet, the new enactment soon changed the
substantive rights for the parties of interest, in many circumstances
expanded the role of the court-appointed receiver, and impacted the
discretionary authority of the courts of Chancery.
Although Chancery courts exercising general equity jurisdiction have
the inherent power to appoint a receiver, the IMFL codified the usage
and rules of equity pertaining to such appointment. 235 The IMFL was
intended to integrate the law of mortgage foreclosure into one statute.236
Prior to the IMFL, Illinois foreclosure laws were spread out through
various sections of statutory law. 237 Further, these earlier laws did not
take into account many court decisions on mortgage foreclosures.238
Therefore, the IMFL attempted to integrate all of the laws pertaining to
mortgages and foreclosures into one statutory body. 239

233. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Governor William H. Cabell (Aug. 11, 1807) (on file
with the Library of Congress).
234. Jack H. Tibbetts, Personal Observations of 20 Years with the Illinois Mortgage
Foreclosure Law, ISBA REAL PROPERTY NEWSLETTER 9 (Ill. State Bar Assoc., Springfield, Ill.,
Jan. 2009)
235. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1701(c) (2012).
236. Steven C. Lindberg & Wayne Bender, The Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 76 ILL.
B.J. 800, 800 (1987).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. It should be noted that the IMFL’s drafters considered allowing for a non-judicial
power of sale for commercial real estate, which had mortgages of several millions of dollars. The
proposed provision therein would have permitted sophisticated, business-savvy parties to adopt a
power of sale procedure when drafting a mortgage. Therefore, the parties in the commercial
setting could have provided in the mortgage that, in the event of a default, a remedy could be
judicial or non-judicial. Other considerations dealt with whether other courts, such as a
bankruptcy court, would challenge the non-judicial mortgage foreclosure decisions. This aspect
of the IMFL, however, was excluded from the law. The view seemed to be that the commercial
borrower still needed the protection of the judicial procedures. These same procedures could
provide possible protection to third parties as well. Tibbetts, supra note 234, at 9.
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IV. MODERN DAY RECEIVERS IN ILLINOIS
A. General Overview
When the underlying real estate is generating cash, a commercial
lender almost invariably seeks to have a receiver appointed shortly after
it commences foreclosure proceedings. A professional receiver will
collect rent and pay bills consistent with the statutory scheme
established under the IMFL. 240 Mortgagees typically will incur the
expense of a receiver in exchange for the benefits a receiver provides,
including making sure that certain bills are paid and choking off cash
flow to the borrower who may have been diverting rental funds for
other unpaid bills. Although the receiver is an officer of the court and
must exercise his own judgment, a receiver’s focus should be to ensure
the property is secured and maintained.
The power of the court to appoint a receiver and to place in his
custody the property in controversy (before the defendant has answered)
has become a well-established practice in this country. A court is likely
to appoint a receiver in cases where the complainant can show that he
has an equitable claim to the property in controversy, and that a receiver
is necessary to preserve it from loss; or where the complainant provides
evidence of fraud or imminent danger to the property unless the relief is
granted. 241
B. The Benefit of Appointing a Receiver
As an officer of the court, the receiver acts for the benefit of all
involved parties in a foreclosure proceeding. 242 The receiver has
possession of the mortgaged real estate and the full power and authority
to operate, manage, and conserve such property. In essence, the
receiver is a fiduciary of all the parties to the litigation. 243 As a
fiduciary, the receiver cannot profit from his position of trust other than
through reasonable compensation, which the court may allow under the
law. 244 Therefore, the receiver should act in good faith for the benefit
of creditors, property owners, and all other parties claiming an interest
in the property.

240. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1704.
241. See, e.g., Fiebaugh v. McGovern, 88 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ill. 1949); Compton v. Paul K.
Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Nartzik v. Ehman, 191 Ill. App.
71, 80 (1914).
242. CLARK, supra note 87, at 680.
243. PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Inv. Co., 395 N.E.2d 641, 646 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 426 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. 1981).
244. Ravlin v. Chi. A & De K.R.R., 129 N.E. 730, 736 (Ill. 1921).
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Mortgagees will commonly seek possession of a mortgaged property
to enforce the right to rental income collected and to preserve the
property value during the foreclosure process. When a loan is secured
by a mortgage and note on an income-producing property, such as an
apartment complex, shopping center, or office building, rents provide
the revenue necessary to operate, manage, and maintain the mortgaged
property. Rental income is sometimes the source from which the
payments on the mortgaged loan are drawn. After a default occurs, a
mortgagor may apply the rents to purposes unrelated to the mortgaged
property or the mortgage loan. Thus, a mortgagor, when faced with the
possibility of losing the mortgaged property, may utilize the rent
revenues for purposes unrelated to the mortgaged property. This
process is often referred to as “milking.” 245
A mortgagor implementing this practice will drain the rent revenues
as much as possible before having to surrender the property. For
instance, a mortgagor may enter into leases in which he will require
advance payment of all lease funds, require cancellation of a long-term
lease favorable to the tenant in exchange for a cash payment to the
mortgagor, or maintain all current leases and collect the rents but at the
same time fail to pay taxes, utilities, insurance, and outstanding invoices
related to repairs. 246
C. The Basis for Appointing a Receiver
Under the IMFL, a mortgagee has the right to an appointment of a
receiver if he is in possession of the non-residential property prior to
judgment. 247 The statute provides that in matters involving nonresidential property, the mortgagee “shall” upon request be placed in
possession of the mortgaged property, after the filing of a foreclosure
complaint and before the entry of a judgment of foreclosure, if the
mortgagee is so authorized by the terms of the mortgage, and the court
is satisfied that there is a “reasonable probability” the mortgagee will
prevail on a final hearing of the cause. 248 If the mortgagee can satisfy
these elements of the IMFL, the mortgagor must object and show “good
cause” to be able to remain in possession of the property during the
foreclosure proceeding. 249 The inquiry as to whether the mortgagee
245. GEORGE E. OSBORNE, GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW 230 (1979).
246. Id.
247. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1219 (2012) (defining what is residential and nonresidential property).
248. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1701(b)(2).
249. Id. See infra Part V for a more detailed discussion of the concepts of “reasonable
probability” and “good cause.”
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should prevail in his request for pre-judgment possession commences
with the mortgage document and the filing of the mortgage foreclosure
action.
A mortgage foreclosure cause of action is a legal proceeding
instituted by the mortgagee to terminate the mortgagor’s interest in the
property. In Illinois, the process of instituting and prosecuting a
commercial foreclosure action is set forth in the IMFL. 250 The
mortgagee has a right to foreclose on the property only when the
mortgagor defaults on the mortgage. 251 The mortgage, note, and other
pertinent loan documents relating to the property define the conduct that
gives rise to a default. Some conditions that frequently cause a
mortgage default include failing to make a monthly payment, filing for
bankruptcy, and breaching a material contractual obligation under the
loan agreement. After a default, the mortgagee has the option of
accelerating any outstanding balance on the loan, commencing an action
at law or in equity (including the commencement of a foreclosure
proceeding), or exercising some other remedy provided in the mortgage
documents to collect the unpaid loan balance. 252 The mortgagor may
pursue all or some of those remedies concurrently or successively. 253
Although a mortgagee’s various remedies are typically detailed in the
mortgage documents, the mortgagee is limited to one satisfaction.254
Thus, a mortgagee’s right to foreclose on property pursuant to a
commercial mortgage commences with a mortgagor’s default, and in
conjunction with the mortgagee’s other cumulative rights in relation to
the defaulted mortgagor.
1. Mortgage
As previously stated, the IMFL provides that a mortgagee of nonresidential real estate is entitled to pre-judgment property possession or
appointment of a receiver only if authorized by the terms of the
mortgage instrument. 255 Modern commercial mortgages typically
contain a provision in which the mortgagor consents to the appointment
of a receiver following a default, without regard to whether the
mortgagor is insolvent or whether the physical condition of the property
has deteriorated or been damaged. Generally, the trial court’s decision

250. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1101 to 5/15-1706.
251. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Bryant, 378 N.E.2d 333, 336 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
252. Markus v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 27 N.E.2d 463, 465 (Ill. 1940).
253. Skach v. Lydon, 306 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
254. Abdul-Karim v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Champaign Nat’l Bank, 101 Ill. 2d 400,
406–07 (1984).
255. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1701(b)(2), 5/15-1702(a), 5/15-1704(a).

3_REYES.DOCX

2013]

4/18/2013 11:08 AM

Development of the Receivership Statute in Illinois

1053

to not appoint a receiver should not be reversed unless it is found to be
an abuse of discretion. 256
The language of the mortgage agreement and other documentary
evidence largely determines whether a court will award possession of a
mortgaged property to a receiver. 257 Clear language in the mortgage
agreement providing for the appointment of a receiver is strong
evidence that the mortgagor has agreed to such a remedy. The IMFL,
however, severely circumscribes the exercise of the court’s discretion,
as it directs a court to appoint a receiver whenever “a mortgagee entitled
to possession so requests.” 258 Absent any contractual provision in the
mortgage authorizing pre-judgment possession or receivership, the
mortgagee will likely have to wait until the conclusion of the
foreclosure proceeding to obtain possession of the property and begin
collecting rents.
2. Assignment of Rents
In order to allow mortgagees to collect rental income sooner than the
completion of the foreclosure proceeding, Illinois law permits a
mortgagee to insert an assignment of rents clause into a mortgage
agreement. This clause provides a sufficient interest in the rents to
authorize the appointment of a receiver through whom the mortgagee
can collect rents. 259 In other words, a “mortgagee has no specific lien
upon the rents and profits of the mortgaged land unless he has in his
mortgage stipulated for a specific pledge of them as part of his
security.” 260 Under Illinois law, an assignment of rents clause in a
mortgage does not grant the mortgagee a lien on specific rents already
in the possession of the mortgagor—such a lien would violate the
general rule that a mortgagor does not have to account to the mortgagee
for rents while he remains in possession of the property at issue.
Instead, an assignment of rents provision allows the mortgagee to take
steps after a default—but before a completion of the foreclosure
proceedings—to obtain possession of property and start collecting
rents. 261 Until the mortgagee takes such steps, the mortgagor is entitled
to keep any rental income generated by the commercial property.

256.
257.
1991).
258.
259.
260.
261.
1994).

DeKalb Bank v. Purdy, 520 N.E.2d 957, 962 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
Home Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 777 F. Supp. 629, 633 (N.D. Ill.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1702(a).
Bagley v. Ill. Trust & Sav. Bank, 64 N.E. 1085, 1086 (Ill. 1902).
First Nat’l Bank v. Ill. Steel Co., 51 N.E. 200, 202 (Ill. 1898).
See In re Wheaton Oaks Office Partners Ltd. P’ship, 27 F.3d 1234, 1241–44 (7th Cir.
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The receiver in a foreclosure action does not act on behalf of a
mortgagee. Rather, a mortgagee may designate the name of a receiver
to the court, and a court may in its discretion appoint a receiver to
maintain the property as an officer of the court. A court-appointed
receiver is generally tasked with collecting rents, issues, and profits
from the mortgaged property. 262 The receiver holds the rents and other
profits in excess of expenses—if any rent proceeds remain after the
foreclosure is completed and the mortgage indebtedness is satisfied, the
mortgager is entitled to the rent revenues. 263
D. The Appointment of the Receiver
The mortgagee may run to the courthouse to seek the appointment of
a receiver under the circumstances outlined above. Because the
receiver’s possession of the mortgaged premises is the same as the
mortgagor’s possession, the receiver steps into the mortgagor’s shoes as
to all leases for the property. Because Illinois adheres to the general
rule that rents are incidental to property possession, 264 a mortgagor, as
the party in possession and owner of the statutory right of redemption, is
entitled to the rents generated from the property. 265 The mortgagor is
not required to account for such rental income to the mortgagee so long
as he holds onto the property. This scenario can cause problems for the
mortgagee should the mortgagor default on the underlying debt.
In this scenario, the mortgagee would like to start collecting the rents
generated from the property and apply the funds towards any
deficiencies under the mortgage obligation. The only manner in which
the mortgagee can access this rental income is if the mortgagee actually
acquires possession of the property. It is highly unlikely that the
mortgagor will voluntarily relinquish possession of the property to the
mortgagee, who may want to milk the property of all rents, and at the
same time not make the mortgage payments. Consequently, the
mortgagee will need to obtain actual possession, or possession through
the appointment of a receiver, in a court of Chancery. 266 The case law
in this area makes clear that a mortgagee must obtain possession to the
property in order to collect the rents. 267 The rationale for this principle
is that a mortgagee should not be permitted to collect rental revenue
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
1995).

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1704(b)(2).
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Schwarz, 33 N.E.2d 934, 937 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941).
DeKalb Bank v. Purdy, 520 N.E.2d 957, 962 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
Id.
Comerica Bank-Ill. v. Harris Bank Hinsdale, 673 N.E.2d 380, 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
Id.; Fid. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 71 F.3d 1306, 1308 (7th Cir.
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without assuming the expenses of possessing the property and ensuring
that it is properly maintained.
1. The Receiver
Under the IMFL, the mortgagee is allowed to select the receiver he
wishes to be appointed by the court. 268 The decision as to which
receiver to select and present for the court’s consideration will depend
on (among other factors) the type of property or collateral to be secured,
the size and scope of the property or collateral, the condition of the
property (e.g., whether it requires construction), the type of business of
the mortgagor, and the experience of the receiver in these respective
areas.
The mortgagee’s choice will depend in large part on the receiver’s
anticipated responsibilities during the foreclosure process.
For
example, a mortgagee seeking a receiver for a multi-unit apartment
building will want to select a property manager experienced in
managing large apartment complexes. In contrast, a mortgagee seeking
a receiver for a property under construction may seek a receiver with a
construction management background to oversee site work on the
property. Similarly, a mortgagee seeking a receiver for the liquidation
of equipment or inventory of a commercial enterprise will want an
experienced liquidator who has a business background or the knowledge
and experience to sell such inventory.
Today’s receivers are no longer merely officers of the court charged
with the sole duty of collecting rents and protecting the collateral on the
mortgage. In the modern world of mortgage foreclosures, a receiver
must be a multi-tasker with the skills and abilities necessary to
effectively fulfill the orders of the court.
2. The Order Appointing Receiver
In essence, the underlying mortgage documents and financing
agreements executed and entered into by the parties form the basis for
the appointment of a receiver. As previously discussed, the receiver is
appointed by and works for the court, with the goal of preserving and
protecting the property for the benefit of the parties. Although
recommended by the mortgagee, the receiver does not take orders or
directions from the mortgagee. The receiver must obey court orders so
long as an order remains in effect and unimpeached—the receiver’s
power to perform his duties and responsibilities flows from the order

268. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1701(c) (2012). A receiver must not be a company or other
business entity. Id.
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granting the appointment of the receiver. 269
The extent, quality, and detail of the order are without question
essential and critical. Furthermore, the court has the inherent authority
to enforce the order regarding the appointment of a receiver.270
Therefore, a judge should take considerable care when drafting the
order. The relation of a receiver to the court and the receiver’s authority
to act is determined by the court’s order issuing the appointment. 271 As
a result, the mortgagee and the prospective receiver should carefully
review the order to avoid any unnecessary revisions once the receiver
commences work on the property. Doing so will also prevent the
receiver from making unnecessary appearances in court to obtain
approval of any and all minor actions or expenditures.
Ultimately, the authority and power of the receiver are those granted
by the order of the court appointing the receiver. As long as the
receiver does not overstep these powers, the receiver is protected even
though the orders may be deemed improper or reversed on appeal. 272
The court order approving the final receiver’s report is a ratification of
the receiver’s actions. In instances where the receiver has incurred
expenditures without leave of court, the receiver must establish that the
actions were necessary and appropriate. 273
3. Bond
Before the receiver has been appointed and assumed his
responsibilities, the individual must secure a good and sufficient bond in
an amount determined by the court from a recognized and authorized
surety. A receiver’s bond is conditioned on the faithful discharge of a
receiver’s duties and responsibilities in the named cause of action and
compliance with the court’s orders. In other words, the purpose of the
bond is to ensure the faithful performance of the receiver’s duties in the
care and administration of the property. The court determines the
amount of the bond after careful inquiry as to all relevant factors
associated with the property in question.

269. Witters v. Hicks, 780 N.E.2d 713, 722 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
270. U.S. Fid. & Guar., Co. v. Old Orchard Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 672 N.E.2d 876, 882–83 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996).
271. CLARK, supra note 87, at 36–37.
272. Reardon v. Youngquist, 362 N.E.2d 439, 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1914).
273. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1704. The IMFL provides that the receiver “shall have all
the usual powers of receivers in like cases.” Id. § 5/15-1704(b). Therefore, the language of the
statute indicates that receivers appointed under the IMFL are to be treated the same as other
receivers.
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4. Receiver’s Duties
The receiver should carefully consider how best to manage and
preserve the property during the receivership. One of the first tasks that
a receiver should carry out is a thorough walkthrough and examination
of the property (so long as he has obtained the mortgagor’s consent). If
possible, the walkthrough should take place pre-appointment, within the
bounds of the law, in order to provide the court with as much
information available to issue an order.
The receiver is also tasked with using all reasonable efforts to
maintain the property. 274 A receiver likely does not have a right to sell
the real estate that is the subject of the receivership estate. Some
Illinois courts, however, have permitted receivers to sell units of an
unfinished condominium with the proceeds applied to the mortgage
indebtedness. 275 Certain courts may permit a receiver to sell the
property under his control if the parties so agree or if the real estate is in
imminent danger.
Similarly, the receiver has a duty to manage the mortgaged real estate
as would a prudent person. The receiver should take into account the
effect of the receiver’s property management on the interest of the
mortgagor. 276 To the extent the receiver obtains sufficient receipts from
the mortgaged real estate, the court will require the receiver to maintain
existing casualty and liability insurance, use reasonable efforts to
maintain the mortgaged real estate, and make repairs and improvements
necessary to comply with building and housing codes. Additionally, if
there are sufficient proceeds for the operating and other expenses of the
property, a court may charge the receiver with paying such costs. 277
When a receiver fails to exercise the care of a prudent person in
renting the property, violates a court order, or fails to collect rent, a
court may charge the receiver the amounts the receiver failed to
collect. 278 Furthermore, though the IMFL imposes a duty on the
receiver to pay certain expenses, it also addresses the scenario where
there may not be sufficient funds to so. 279 For instance, if there are
insufficient funds generated to maintain the property, the court may
274. Id. § 5/15-1704(c)(2).
275. Stephen M. Lasser, When Owners Fall Behind, THE COOPERATOR, http://cooperator.
com/articles/921/1/When-Owners-Fall-Behind/Page1.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013); Samuel H.
Levine, The Use of Receiverships for Managing Troubled Assets, ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP (2010),
http://legalnews.arnstein.com/wp-content/uploads/Commercial-Solutions-Summer-2010-HQ.pdf.
276. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1704(c).
277. Id.
278. Matchless Metal Polish Co. v. Knippel, No. 42858, slip op. at 3–4 (Ill. App. Ct. filed
Mar. 9, 1934).
279. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1704(c).
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grant the receiver authority to borrow money, 280 so long as such
borrowing is deemed in the best interest of the parties. 281 In many
cases, the source of the additional funds is the mortgagee; accordingly,
the court may permit a lien to attach to the property. 282 Prior to
permitting the receiver to borrow funds for property expenses, the
parties must convince the court that doing so is necessary to preserve
the property and that all parties consent to the borrowing scheme.
Pursuant to the IMFL, a receiver also has the power and authority to
secure tenants and execute leases for the property on terms that are
customary for the type and use involved. A receiver even has the power
to accept and reject leases. The IMFL, however, explicitly provides that
mere appointment of the receiver does not automatically terminate any
lease. 283
Often, the mortgagor presents the issue of whether the receiver will
pay real estate taxes during the appointment proceedings. Although the
IMFL does not mandate that a receiver pay real estate taxes, it does
mandate that to the extent the receiver obtains sufficient receipts from
the mortgaged real estate, the receiver “shall” perform certain
functions 284 and may perform other functions with those receipts. 285
The payment of real estate taxes is not included in the determined list of
mandated and permitted functions. Indeed, the IMFL states that a
receiver has the authority to pay taxes levied against the mortgaged
property, but not that the receiver must do so. 286 The IMFL provides a
list of how receipts received from the management and operation of the
real estate should be allocated; the first seven provisions do not
reference the payment of real estate taxes and the final provision states
that the balance of receipts shall be held or distributed as ordered by the
court. 287 Accordingly, the IMFL does not mandate the receiver to pay
real estate taxes. 288

280. Cody Trust Co. v. Hotel Clayton Co., 12 N.E.2d 32, 35, 37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937).
281. Equitable Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Chi., Peoria & St. Louis R.R. Co., 223 Ill. App. 445, 449
(1921).
282. Berman, supra note 153, at 76.
283. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1701(e). See Kelley/Lehr & Assocs., Inc. v. O’Brien, 551
N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
284. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1704(c)(1)–(4).
285. Id. § 5/15-1704(c)(5)–(9).
286. Id. § 5/15-1704(b)(5). See Midwest Bank & Trust Co. v. US Bank, 859 N.E.2d 71, 74
(Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that the statutory language does not obligate receivers to pay real
estate taxes).
287. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1704(d).
288. Furthermore, the pre-IMFL case law was of the view that a receiver was never justified
in paying taxes. See Perlman v. Marzano, 170 N.E. 254, 256 (Ill. 1930).
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5. Compensating the Receiver
The court has the discretion to determine the receiver’s compensation
for services rendered. 289 The receiver has the burden of establishing the
reasonableness of the fees. 290 If a court determines that the receiver has
sufficiently satisfied the reasonableness test, the burden shifts to the
respondent to demonstrate that the fees in question are not
reasonable. 291 However, the court may deny or reduce a receiver’s fee
if the receiver delegated his managerial responsibilities to an agent
without court approval, 292 even though the IMFL imbues broad
authority in the receiver to “employ counsel, custodians, janitors and
other help.” 293
E. Discharging the Receiver
The appointed receiver is an officer of the court. Consequently, the
property placed in the hands of the receiver is in legal custody of the
court for the benefit of all parties in interest. Therefore, any
unauthorized interference of said possession, either by taking forcible
possession of the property committed to the receiver’s charge or by
legal proceedings for that purpose, without the sanction of the
appointing court, is a direct and immediate contempt of court. 294 A
court’s determination of direct contempt is based upon the act and not
upon the alleged intention of the offending party. Furthermore, that the
mortgagor or offending party sought legal advice and acted (at least in
part) upon such advice cannot be a legal defense for contempt. 295
If a receiver is found in contempt by a court, has not performed in
accordance with the court order, or is poorly managing the property, the
receiver may be removed from his duties. The power of a court of
equity to remove or discharge a receiver is well-settled in Illinois law
and may be exercised at any stage of the litigation. 296 Reasonable
attorney fees may be awarded when the appointment of a receiver is
revoked or set aside. 297 Additionally, either party may bring a motion
to discharge the receiver, so long as the motion provides a sufficient
reason to remove the receiver and suggests a new receiver with

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Brackett v. Sedlacek, 452 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
Id.
Id. at 841.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1704(c).
Id. § 5/15-1704(b)(4).
Jones v. Heritage Pullman Bank & Trust Co., 518 N.E.2d 231, 236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
Anderson v. Macek, 182 N.E. 745, 746 (Ill. 1932).
HIGH, supra note 26, at 974–75.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-415(a).
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appropriate qualifications.
V. INTERPRETING THE RECEIVERSHIP PROVISIONS IN THE IMFL
A. The Presumption
In Illinois, prior to the completion of a mortgage foreclosure, a
mortgagee most likely will seek the appointment of a receiver to
manage and operate the mortgaged property. A receiver can be a
valuable tool for the mortgagee to: (1) collect rents; (2) manage existing
tenant relationships; (3) negotiate and find new leases; (4) handle the
day-to-day operations; and (5) avoid waste, loss or destruction. 298 A
judge may appoint a receiver as an exercise of the court’s equity
jurisdiction. The rights of a mortgagee to appoint a receiver in Illinois
are governed by chapter 735, act 5, sections 15-1701 and 15-1702 of the
Illinois Compiled Statutes (the “Receivership Provisions”). 299 The
statute provides: “Whenever a mortgagee entitled to possession so
requests, the court shall appoint a receiver.” 300 In this context, the word
“shall” means “mandatory and not permissive.” 301 Under the IMFL, the
mortgagee is entitled to be placed in possession of the property provided
that the mortgagee shows: (1) that the mortgage or other written
instrument authorizes such possession; and (2) there is reasonable
probability that the mortgagee will prevail on a final hearing of the
cause. 302 If the mortgagor objects and shows good cause, the court is
required to allow the mortgagor to remain in possession. Whenever a
mortgagee is entitled to possession, the court is required to appoint a
receiver. Illinois courts do not view the appointment of a receiver as a
“drastic” remedy. 303 Based on the Receivership Provisions and Illinois
case law, it is the burden of the mortgagor to demonstrate that a receiver
should not be appointed for a commercial mortgaged property. In
essence, the Chancery courts interpretation of the Receivership
Provisions in the IMFL has created a strong presumption in favor of a
mortgagee attempting to appoint a receiver for a commercial-mortgaged
property. Thus, a mortgagor will have to overcome a substantial burden
in order to establish that there is “good cause” under the Receivership
Provisions that a receiver should not be appointed.
298. See Lasser, supra note 275 (providing a variety of roles that a receiver can play when
owners fall behind on payments).
299. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1701 to 1702.
300. Id. § 5/15-1702(a).
301. Id. § 5/15-1105.
302. Id. § 5/15-1701(b)(2); Centerpoint Props. Trust v. Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 923
N.E.2d 878, 883 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
303. See Travelers Ins. Co., v. La Salle Nat’l Bank, 558 N.E.2d 579, 582 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
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B. Reasonable Probability
A proven default establishes a reasonable probability of success in a
mortgage foreclosure cause of action. Therefore, before a mortgagor
needs to demonstrate “good cause” that the appointment of a receiver is
not an appropriate remedy, the mortgagee must first establish there is a
“reasonable probability that the mortgagee will prevail on a final
hearing for cause.” 304 The inquiry by the court of equity of “whether a
default in fact exists will typically turn on the interpretation of
documentary evidence—a non-discretionary function.” 305 It should be
noted that the IMFL does not set forth what the mortgagee must
establish to prevail on the concept of reasonable probability. Therefore,
to assert what constitutes a reasonable probability one needs to look to
case law.
In order to determine whether a default exists, the court will examine
loan documents and other supporting evidence, such as default letters.
In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., an affidavit from a
bank officer of the mortgagee setting forth the various defaults of the
mortgagor was deemed sufficient for the mortgagee to establish that the
mortgagor was in default. 306 The court held that evidence of a proven
default under the mortgage documents was sufficient to show a
reasonable probability that the mortgagee will prevail on a final
hearing. 307 Furthermore, the mortgagee has no obligation to allege
misdeeds or omissions on behalf of the mortgagors to be placed in
possession of the property. 308
Thus, the mortgage and the related loan documents may define the
conduct giving rise to a default, such as failing to make a monthly
payment, filing for bankruptcy, or breaching a material contractual
obligation under the loan documents. The mortgagee may sufficiently
establish a “reasonable probability” of prevailing in a foreclosure action
because of the mortgagor’s admission to failing to make interest
payments, late charge payments, and real estate tax escrow payments.309
Additionally, a mortgagor’s failure to pay property taxes, when raised
by the mortgagee, can be a basis for determining that the mortgagee has
a reasonable probability of succeeding. 310 As a result, a proven default
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
1991).
310.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1701(b)(2).
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 638 N.E.2d 640, 646 (Ill. App. 1993).
Id. at 646–47.
Id.
Travelers Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d at 582.
Home Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 777 F. Supp. 629, 631 (N.D. Ill.
Barclays Bank PLC v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 607, at
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is sufficient to establish a reasonable probability of prevailing in a
mortgage foreclosure matter. 311 Therefore, the right to seek the
appointment of a receiver will only arise if the mortgagor has defaulted
on the mortgage. Accordingly, where there is no default, there is no
right to institute a foreclosure proceeding. 312 Recent decisions by
Illinois courts have supported the presumption that the mortgagee is
entitled to the appointment of a receiver if the mortgagee otherwise
meets the requirements of the Receivership Provisions, and has clarified
that the burden is on the mortgagor to demonstrate “good cause” that
the appointment of a receiver is not an appropriate remedy.
In summary, the Receivership Provisions create a strong presumption
in favor of a mortgagee attempting to appoint a receiver for a
commercial property. In addition, a mortgagor will have to overcome a
substantial burden in order to establish that there is “good cause” under
the Receivership Provisions that a receiver should not be appointed.
C. Good Cause
If the mortgagee has established it has both authorization to take
possession of the property pursuant to the terms of the mortgage or
other written instrument 313 and a reasonable probability of prevailing on
a final hearing, then the burden shifts to the mortgagor to object and
show “good cause” in order to avoid the appointment of a receiver. In a
recent line of cases, the Illinois Appellate Court addressed the issue of
what constitutes “good cause” (albeit by rejected arguments
demonstrating what is not “good cause”). 314 For instance, in Travelers
Insurance Co. v. LaSalle National Bank, the court rejected the
plaintiff’s allegations of fraud, waste, mismanagement, or other
dissipation of the mortgaged real estate. 315 The court reasoned that the
argument raised by the mortgagor was “nothing more than defendants’
attempt to shift the burden of making a good cause showing onto the
plaintiff.” 316 The mortgagee is under “no obligation to allege misdeeds
or omissions on the part of the mortgagors in order to be placed in
*1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 1, 1992).
311. Centerpoint Props. Trust v. Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 923 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2010).
312. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Bryant, 378 N.E.2d 333, 336 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
313. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1701(b)(2) (2012).
314. Bank of Am. v. 108 N. State Retail LLC, 928 N.E.2d 42, 58–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010);
Centerpoint Props. Trust, 923 N.E.2d at 883–87; Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Dearborn
Street Bldg. Assocs., LTD., No. 90 C 7143, 1991 WL 18431, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31 1991);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 558 N.E.2d 579, 582 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
315. Travelers Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d at 582.
316. Id.
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possession.” 317 Moreover, in Home Life Insurance Co. v. American
National Bank & Trust Co., the court rejected the argument that there
was “no more qualified manager” for the mortgaged property than the
current property manager. 318
Another failed argument of good cause pertains to whether the
mortgaged property “can be better performed by the mortgagor or by
the mortgagee and/or its receiver.” 319 In one case, the demonstration of
“good cause” as the harm that would be incurred by the mortgagor if a
receiver were appointed outweighed the harm incurred by the
mortgagee if the mortgagor remained in possession of the property.
Finally, the court has rejected other contentions with regard to good
cause, such as: (1) the receivership would add “a whole new layer of
costs and attorney fees to the underlying indebtedness;” 320 and (2) a
receiver would hurt the development of the property as well as a
mortgagor’s chances of finding new tenants, investors, or potential
buyers.
A seminal case in this area of law is Centerpoint Properties Trust v.
Old Prairie Block Owner, LLC. 321 In Centerpoint, the court held that a
mortgagor’s claims of impediments to selling or refinancing the
property were not a valid defense. The court, in deciding the necessity
of a receiver, was primarily moved by the failure of the mortgagor to
collect rents, effectively maintain the property, obtain sufficient
insurance, and pay invoices and real estate taxes. 322 Furthermore, the
court took note of the fact that under the IMFL, there is a presumption
in favor of a mortgagee’s right to possession, and by extension, the
appointment of a receiver. 323 Regarding these rights during the
pendency of a foreclosure action, the court ruled that a claim stating that
the receiver is not qualified to fulfill its duties regarding the property is
irrelevant. 324
As these cases make clear, a mortgagor will have to overcome a
substantial burden in order to establish that there is “good cause” that a
court should not appoint a receiver in foreclosure actions. The interests
317. Id.
318. Home Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 777 F. Supp. 629, 632 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
319. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 1991 WL 18431, at *5.
320. Id.
321. 923 N.E.2d 878 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
322. Id. at 888. After noting those shortcomings, the court held that an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether a receiver should be appointed was not required because the hearing would
merely delay the trial court’s ultimate findings. Id. at 889.
323. See id. at 883–88.
324. See id. at 885.
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of society require that the power not be interfered with lightly, as it
results from a contract between the parties. Consequently, the party
who borrows must consider the bargain and whether or not too much
power is being given to the other party in the transaction. Furthermore,
in the lexicon of legal opinions there is no one court that has attempted
the task of defining and setting forth what is “good cause.”
The opinion in Centerpoint is the closest any tribunal has come to
setting forth what constitutes “good cause.” The court stated that
evidence of “imminent” funding for the development of property, or an
“imminent” loan to refinance, may persuade a court to find “good
cause,” which would permit the mortgagor to retain possession of the
subject property in the interim. 325 The court stressed that the
transaction would have to be “imminent” and not merely a possibility at
some unknown future date. 326 In sum, there is a strong presumption in
favor of the mortgagee seeking to appoint a receiver in commercial
foreclosure cases. As a result, the mortgagor’s burden of demonstrating
“good cause” as to why a receiver should not be appointed is rather
difficult to overcome.
As has been established, the mortgagee, in order to obtain the
appointment of a receiver, need only show authorization by the terms of
the mortgage or other written instrument and a reasonable probability
that the mortgagee will prevail on a final hearing of the cause.
Mortgagors, on the other hand, will be left contending with the
presumption favoring the mortgagee in the appointment of a receiver.
The possibility of the mortgagor prevailing over the appointment will
require more than a reliance on probability and chance.
D. Possibilities and Probabilities Are Not a Defense
The probability that conditions will considerably improve, and that
the mortgagor will therefore be better able in the near future to
discharge the indebtedness, does not merit the interference of equity, if
for no other reason than because it is too vague and indefinite to be
capable of determining with certainty. This result stays true no matter
how strongly our sympathies may be with the unfortunate defaulting
mortgagor who has become the victim of economic hard times. This
sympathy cannot be a basis for equity jurisdiction, and in Chancery
cannot be an instrument of speculation as to the future values of the
property in question even for the benefit of the unfortunate mortgagorspeculator. Those who speculate in real estate take the risk of
325. Id.
326. Id.
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depression in value of the property at the time the loan expires. If the
Chancellor that sits in Chancery has the right and power to disregard
statutory mandates or prohibit the enforcement of a right merely
because of adverse conditions or resulting misfortunes that have fallen
upon the mortgagor, the outcome would be to greatly limit, if not
entirely destroy, all commercial mortgage dealings based upon a signed
contract. No lender would feel secure in loaning money under an
obligation that the borrower would repay the loan pursuant to their
agreement. This legal scenario would result in different rules applicable
to one individual from another, and under similar circumstances,
dependent only upon the whim of the judge presiding over the case of
the woeful facts. As a result, Chancery has frowned on interfering with
the regular procedure of the foreclosure process. The rights of a
mortgagee demand the protection of a court of equity no less than those
of the mortgagor.
Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory requirements and
provisions than can courts of law. The courts of equity are bound by the
provisions set forth in a statute, and where the rights of the parties are
clearly defined and established by law, equity has no power to change
or disturb those rights. Equity, however, has throughout the years met
all conditions where an injustice or wrong would otherwise result.
Equity’s modes of relief are not fixed and rigid; Chancery can mold
remedies to meet the conditions with which it has to deal. The
mortgagor, in the midst of a commercial mortgage foreclosure and
facing the presumptive appointment of a receiver, need not despair;
relief may be on its way if not today then tomorrow. For the pendulum
of equity most certainly will swing the other way. Arguably, it appears
that the court has slowly commenced winding the presumption clock in
another direction.
CONCLUSION
It is the spirit and not the form of law that keeps justice alive. 327

– Earl Warren
An economic crisis is undeniably an emergency, and in times of
emergencies, not only is there authority, but there is a clear duty upon
courts of equity to use every lawful means to alleviate the stress and
tension of the resultant situation. Nevertheless, courts of equity are also
as much bound by the statutes in place as are the other branches of
government. Thus, equity cannot and will not interfere with the lawful
327. THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 11 (Tony Lyons ed., 2010).
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and orderly procedure of the appointment of a receiver in a foreclosure
matter where it is clearly set forth by the legislative body of the state.
Interpret and analyze as it may, a court of equity must still exercise
discretion within the confines of the statute. Courts of equity
throughout the ages, however, have carefully scrutinized all shifts,
subterfuges, and devices that have sought to lessen the possessive
interest of the mortgagor and the security interest of the mortgagee.
More fundamentally, a failure by the courts of Chancery to enforce the
current statutory receivership provisions as strong antidotes to financial
crisis may establish a de facto acquiescence to the dominant demands of
the financial marketplace. At that point, our laws become the resting
place for unfair practices and broad disrespect for the law generally. In
this backdrop of economic instability, as the modern courts of equity
endeavor to balance the property interests of the mortgagor and the
mortgagee, it becomes evident why the appointment of a receiver has
been viewed throughout the ages as the foremost equitable remedy that
a court of equity can exercise.

